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5 Public Expenditure on Social 
Security 
Jonathan Bradshaw 
Introduction 
Social security is by far the largest public expenditure programme 
and now accounts for a quarter of all public expenditure. Unlike 
most of the other expenditure programmes, social security has up 
to now been protected from intentional cuts: there has been con-
troversy about whether benefits have been increased sufficiently to 
maintain their value but no government since the war has explicitly 
admitted that it intended to cut benefits to reduce expenditure on 
social security. The Conservative government elected in 1979 
changed all this. They plan to reduce public expenditure in volume 
terms over the four years 1980/1-1983/4 and social security has 
not escaped the axe. The proposals for cuts are discussed later in 
this chapter but first, in order to indicate why public expenditure 
on social security has managed to avoid earlier cuts by successive 
governments and why the present government's plans are so sig-
nificant, it would be useful to outline the special nature of social 
security expenditure. 
The Nature of Social Security Expenditure 
Growth factors 
Social security expenditure is the largest of the public expenditure 
programmes and it has grown in money terms, in real terms (by 
£7000 million in the last ten years), as a proportion of all public 
expenditure and as a proportion of GDP. Table 5.1 shows how 
public expenditure has increased during the latter part of the 
1970s. 
Not all of this increase, or even the bulk of it, has occurred as a 
result of real improvements in the level or coverage of social 
security benefits. Of course, most of the increase in money terms 
on. 
 social security has come from efforts to maintain the value of 
existing benefits in line with increases in prices or earnings: the 
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Table 5.1 Social security expenditure 1974/75-1980/81 
197415 197516 197617 197718 197819 1979180 198011 
At 1979 survey 
prices (£ million) 14 172 15 378 15 838 16 655 18 266 18 890 19 354 
As a percentage of 
total public 
expenditure 19.8 21.1 22.4 24.5 25.3 25.2 26.0 
As a percentage 
of GDP 9.2 9.8 10.1 10.0 10.8 10.6 
Source: Calculations based on Treasury, The government's expenditure plans 
1980181 to 1983 /4, Cmnd 7841, London, HMSO, 1980, Tables 1.2 and 
1.6.• 
November 1980 uprating in benefits alone cost an extra £3000 
million. Whether governments have succeeded in maintaining the 
value of benefits will be considered further below. 
The next most important determinant of the level of public 
expenditure on social security is the number of people qualifying 
for benefits and as the number of social security beneficiaries 
increases so does the level of social security expenditure. The most 
important cause of this increase in the last ten years has been the 
rising number of retired elderly in the population and the result-
ing increased expenditure on retirement pensions: there were 6.5 
million retirement pensions in payment in 1966 and 8.8 million in 
1979 (DHSS 1980b: Table 13.30). There have over the period been 
steady increases in other groups dependent on social security: 
while the number of widows has declined, rising rates of divorce 
and separation have increased the number of one-parent families 
in receipt of supplementary benefit, family income supplement 
(FIS) and child benefit increase (now one-parent benefit). The 
number of single parents on supplementary benefits has increased 
by one-third during the 1970s and the number of divorced women 
on supplementary benefit has more than trebled in ten years 
(DHSS 1980b: Table 34.32). The most dramatic increases in social 
security expenditure are now coming as a result of increases in the 
number of the unemployed, an increase of 100,000 in the numbers 
of the unemployed is estimated to cost about £110 million per 
annum in benefits alone (Treasury 1980a: 114). 
Not all the demographic changes that have occurred over the last 
ten years have led to increases in expenditure. The numbers of 
widows and war pensioners have declined and the number of child 
benefit payments has declined since 1978 as a result of the fall in 
the birth-rate in the mid-1960s. In general though demographic 
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changes have increased dependency in the population. The rising 
numbers of elderly in particular have led and will continue to lead 
to increases in social expenditure unless there are cuts in benefit 
levels. 
Table 5.2 Expenditure on broad groups of beneficiaries as a percentage of total 
social security expenditure (at 1978 survey prices) 
Elderly Disabled Short- Unemployed Widows Family 
and long- 	 term 	 and 
Year 	 term sick 	 sick 	 orphans 
1973/74 56.5 10.3 6.3 6.0 6.1 10.1 
1978/79 54.0 11.4 4.6 8.6 4.6 12.8 
1982/83° 54.9 12.5 4.3 7.7 4.2 12.6 
Note: a planned. 
Source: Calculations based on Treasury, The government's expenditure plans 
1979/80 to 1982/83, Cmnd 7439, London, HMSO, 1979, p.153. 
The 1978 white paper for the first time gave details of expendi-
ture allocated to the main groups of beneficiaries. Table 5.2 sum-
marises this for three years and shows that the elderly take over 
half the social security budget. Based as it is on predictions carried 
out in 1978 the table underestimates the share of the budget that 
will be spent on the unemployed by 1982/3. 
Another semi-automatic reason for social security expenditure 
to increase  is as a result of increases in the take-up of benefits. For 
example, the number of claimants for family income supplement 
increased from 65,000 in 1971/2 to 95,000 in 1973/4„partly as a 
result of the improvement (which may not have been maintained in 
more recent years) in the rate of take-up. It is also thought that 
efforts to make supplementary benefits more accessible together 
with a greater willingness to claim have led to an increase in the 
take-up. There has certainly been an increase in the proportion of 
supplementary benefit recipients receiving discretionary addi-
tions. The number of exceptional circumstances additions in pay-
ment increased from 753,000 in 1973 to 1,740,000 in 1979 (DHSS 
19806: Table 34.42). These improvements in take-up which 
increase expenditure are not restricted only to means tested 
benefits. New benefits have a `take-on' period, for example, the 
number of recipients of the attendance allowance steadily 
increased from the time it was introduced up to 1978 and part of 
this increase must have occurred as aresult of increasing know-
ledge of the existence of the , benefit. 
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Finally increases in expenditure come as a result of extending 
existing benefits or introducing new ones. During the 1970s a 
number of new benefits were introduced. The FIS in 1971 and 
child benefit increase (formerly child interim benefit, now one-
parent benefit) for single parents in 1976 were two new benefits for 
families with children. By 1980/1 FIS was costing £32 million per 
year. The principal group to receive new benefits during the 1970s 
were the disabled. The attendance allowance, initially payable at 
one rate from 1971, and extended to the less severely disabled at 
another rate in 1975, was costing about £200 million by 1980/1. 
The mobility allowance was phased in from 1976 and by 1980/1 
was costing £103 million per year. Other new benefits for the 
disabled — the invalidity pension for the chronic sick from 1971, the 
non-contributory invalidity pension (NCIP) from 1975 and 
invalid care allowance from 1976 — resulted in much smaller 
increases in expenditure because they were paid at lower rates than 
other insurance benefits and were fully taken into account in 
assessing supplementary benefits (the majority of new recipients 
were already receiving supplementary benefits). It was estimated 
in 1974 that NCIP and ICA would cost £62 million gross, but after 
savings on supplementary benefits would cost less than £9 million 
(Treasury 1975). In November 1977 the payment of NCIP was 
extended to include married women of working age who were 
incapable of normal household duties and this was expected to cost 
£8 million in 1977/8 (Treasury 1978). 
Undoubtedly_the biggest improvement in social security benefits 
introduced in the last ten years has been the new pensions scheme. 
As full entitlement to this will build up over twenty years from 
April 1978 the expenditure effects are only beginning to be felt. 
Pensioners benefited from 1970 by the introduction of the old 
persons' pension for very old pensioners who were not eligible for 
the national insurance pension. By 1980/1 the gross cost of this 
pension had fallen to £33 million, the net cost of it would be very 
small as most of the beneficiaries would be eligible for supplemen-
tary benefits. New benefits were also introduced for pensioners 
from 1972 when the first lump sum or Christmas bonus was paid. 
This cost over £100 million in 1978 and is now paid annually under 
the Pensioners' Payment Act 1979. Additional expenditure under 
the social security programme has also come as the result of 
increases in fuel I__RiCSS. This problem was first dealt with by price 
subsidies but from 1977 began to be covered by additional help for 
poor consumers by means of an electricity discount scheme. From 
1980 the Conservative government replaced this by an additional 
fuel allowance for certain recipients of supplementary benefits and 
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the family income supplement payments were correspondingly 
increased and this was expected to cost £100 million in 1980/1. 
Apart from these new benefits, increases in expenditure have 
come from modifications to existing benefits, such as alterations to 
the earnings rules on national insurance benefit, increases in the 
earnings and capital disregards on supplementary benefits, and a 
reduction in the qualifying hours for full-time work for single 
parents on FIS. One very important change in existing benefits 
occurred in 1977/8 when child tax  allowances and family allow-
ances were replaced by child benefits. The aggregate net value of 
child tax allowances became part of public expenditure, family 
allowances which had been costing £733 millions in 1976/7, as child 
benefits were shown to be costing £2820 million by 1979/80 but 
only £347 million of this increase was a real increase in expendi-
ture, the rest of the 'increase' was a transfer in accounting from tax 
revenue forgone to public expenditure (all these figures at 1979 
survey prices). The relationship between tax allowances and social 
security benefits will be discussed further below. 
It is very difficult to calculate what proportions of increases in 
public expenditure are attributable to each of the factors discussed. 
It is possible to assess the extent to which individual benefits have 
maintained their value and this is done below, but it is difficult to 
assess exactly what proportion of the increase is due to improve-
ments in take-up, what proportion to demographic changes and 
what proportion to new or enhanced benefits. 
Financing of social security expenditure 
Social security expenditure differs from other social expenditure 
in the degree to which it is self-financed by contributions. Over half 
of expenditure on social security is in contributory benefits which 
are financed by contributions from employer, employees and the 
state. As well as being a source of revenue to pay benefits, these 
contributions are a condition of entitlement. They have up to now 
been considered by the trade unions as a guarantee of entitlement, 
a way of ensuring that governments, eager to cut expenditure, do 
not make use of resources allocated to benefits to which rights have 
been accrued. The strength of this argument is somewhat 
weakened by the present government's proposals for cuts discus-
sed below. The distinction between benefits paid from tax revenue 
and benefits paid from the national insurance fund is really some-
what theoretical. Employee national insurance contributions, 
being earnings related, are no more than a rather regressive addi-
tion to income Lax; the contributions paid in are calculated on a 
pay-as-you-go basis. The surplus which the national insurance 
 i e supple ent pay ents were cor es i ly 
 nd this s ex t  t  t  
 fits, i cr it
 odificati s t  existing benefits, such as alter
i  ules on national insurance benefit, increases in the 
i  nd capital disregards on su plementary benefits, and a 
lif  f r i l  
t   IS.  t nge in exi ti  f
 i   f
l ced by il  f te net v lue of 
t of li  , f
 t   ti   illi  y 1979/80 but 
illi  f this incr l i ease in expendi-
t f se' was a transfer in a counting from tax 
t  
 i l 
ill  i  f rt . 
fic lt t  c l l  i  
 ttributable to each of the factors discu sed. 
i it   
 l  nd this is done belo , t it i  if
ti  f se is due to i ov -
i  nges and 
ti  t   nced benefit . 
i  f l rity  
 t
i  t
it
 f  i ti  f  
ll 
e a condition of entitle t. 
 i  s a guarant e of entitlement, 
 t  t ,  
 t  t  f
. t  f gu t i  
 t  t'
 i ti ti  t ee  e efits pai  fr  tax revenue 
l i ance fund is rea ly so e-
l. l i ance contributions, 
i  elated, are no more than a rathe  regressive addi-
; e calculated on a 
l i ance 
96 Public Expenditure and Social Policy 
fund has earned every year during the 1970s (except 1972) is 
employed as part of general revenue and the accumulated surplus 
is not treated as a resource for financing further benefits. Table 5.3 
shows how national insurance contributions have moved as a 
proportion of average earnings over the 1970s. 
Table 5.3 National insurance contributions as a percentage of average earnings 
(male manual) for selected years 
Year 	 Not contracted out 	 Contracted out 
November 1969 
	
6.2 
	
5.2 
September 1971 
	
6.0 	 5.2 
October 1973 
	
5.9 
	
5.3 
August 1974 
	
6.1 
	
5.5 
April 1975 	 5.5 
	
5.5 
April 1978 
	
6.5 
	
4.6 
April 1979 
	
6.5 	 4.6 
April 1980 
	
6.8 
	
3.2 
Source: Social Security Statistics, 1980, London, HMSO. 
Transfer payments 
Public expenditure on social security is a transfer payment rather 
than an expenditure on goods and services (see Chapter 1). The 
benefits are derived from contributions and tax revenues which 
are taken out of private expenditure but then transferred back to 
private expenditure in the form of benefits. Social security (except 
administrative costs) cannot, like other public expenditure, be 
described as a burden on the private sector. It is in fact consumer 
expenditure redistributed from one consumer to another. 
Though it is not a withdrawal from consumer expenditure, it may 
entail a withdrawal from private investment to the extent that 
beneficiaries have a higher propensity to consume than con-
tributors. Transfers act as a built-in stabiliser to the economy giving 
extra purchasing power and reducing insecurity during periods of 
depression. Thus public expenditure on social security may have a 
marginal effect on private investment but helps to maintain private 
consumption. It is not a transfer of resources from the private to 
the public sector. 
The final special characteristic of social security expenditure is 
that is is entirely central government expenditure in contrast to 
expenditure by nationalised industries or local authorities. It can-
not therefore be controlled by such devices as external financing 
 l olicy 
  ing the 1970s (ex t ) i  
 l ev  nd the accu ulated surplus 
t  s a resource for financing further benefits. Table 5.3 
  t ibutions have   
ti  f ge earnings over the 1970s. 
nce contributions as a percentage of average earni gs 
 
ea 	 	 t  t 
ber  
	
	
	
	
	
	
t  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
t . 
l ity i   transfer payment rather 
    nd services (see hapter 1). 
i  t x ev  
 t k  t f i t   t t  t ansferred back to 
it . ci l  ce t 
ti t, li  li  ,  
  burden on the private sector. It is in fact consumer 
i t  f t . 
 l f o  iv te inv t
 i  propensity to consu  t n con-
. nsf s act as a built-in stabiliser to the economy giving 
sing po  and reducing insecurity during periods of 
it
l f
f  f ces f o  t  iv te to 
i cteristic of social security expenditure is 
l l gov n t  i  t ast to 
i   local authorities. It can-
ll  l f i  
Public Expenditure on Social Security 97 
limits and financial targets used in the nationalised industries, or 
cash limits or the rate support grant used to control local 
authorities' expenditure. In social security expenditure only 
expenditure on administration and miscellaneous services can be 
subject to cash limits. 
These characteristics of social security expenditure — that it is 
demand determined, that it rises inevitably with increasing depen-
dency, that benefits are determined by statute and may be under-
written by a contribution condition, that the benefits are transfer 
payments rather than expenditure on goods and services and that 
central government has (ironically) less control over its own 
expenditure — have meant that over the last decade, while there has 
been little real improvement (see below), social security benefits 
have not been cut and social security expenditure has increased. 
The Level of Social Security Benefits 
Perhaps the best way to evaluate past trends in public expenditure 
on social security, given that it is so difficult to disentangle the 
effects of automatic and semi-automatic increases in expenditure 
from real improvements, is to assess what has happened to the 
actual level of benefits. This makes it possible to assess whether 
there have been any real improvements in existing benefits 
(though not how much of increased expenditure is because of new 
benefits). There are a variety of ways in which the value of benefits 
can be compared over time, compared with a price index to assess 
their purchasing power, and against an earnings index and the net 
incomes of those in work to assess relative living standards. 
As far as possible the points chosen for comparison in the follow-
ing tables coincide with the beginning and end of each govern-
ment's period in office, so for example November 1969 is the last 
up-rating of the 1964-70 Labour government, September 1971 
and October 1973 the first and last upratings of the 1970-4 Con-
servative government, July 1974 and November 1978 the first and 
last upratings of the Labour government and November 1979 and 
November 1980 (where figures permit) the first up-rating of the 
present Conservative government. Comparable figures are also 
presented for July 1948 when the social security scheme began and 
April 1961 to indicate the level of benefits in the 1960s. 
Tables 5.4-5.6 give a flavour of how the value of some of the 
most important social security benefits has moved over the last 
decade. The value of the pension has more than doubled since its 
Introduction and continued to move ahead of prices in the first half 
of the 1970s with a big jump in 1974 when the Labour government 
implemented an election promiie of a il0 pension. The up-rating 
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Table 5.4 Retirement pension for a man or woman on own insurance 
Year 
Equivalent value 
at April 1980 
prices (£) 
Per cent of 	 Per cent of average 
average male 	 net income of 
manual earnings 
	 all males 
   
July 1948 
April 1961 
10.85 
14.92 
19.1 
19.1 
— 
— 
November 1969 18.74 20.0 April 1970 23.7 
September 1971 19.30 19.5 April 1971 21.1 
October 1973 20.91 18.9 April 1974 23.3 
July 1974 23.77 21.6 April 1975 28.5 
November 1978 25.11 23.4 April 1978 28.5 
November 1979 25.56 23.6 April 1979 28.3 
November 1980 25.57 — April 1980 27.3 
Source: DHSS, Social Security Statistics, 1980, London, HMSO, Tables 46.09 and 
46.15. 
in November 1980 appears to be the first time that the pension has 
not gained in real value since World War II. In comparison with 
gross and net earnings, the pension has not improved so much; in 
the 1970s particularly there was a decline in its relationship with 
gross earnings during the 1970-4 Conservative government's 
period in office and an increase in the 1974-9 Labour govern-
ment's period in office which was sustained in November 1979. 
However it seems from the April 1980 figures that the November 
1980 up-rating will not have maintained the level of the pension in 
line with manual earnings. 
The pattern for unemployment benefit depends on whether 
earnings-related supplement is included. Earnings-related sup-
plement (ERS) was added to unemployment benefits from 1966 
and is payable after the first two weeks of unemployment for six 
months. Only about one in six of the unemployed are receiving 
ERS at any one time. For the unemployed who are relying only on 
the standard benefit for their income the scales have almost dou-
bled since 1948 but during the 1970s there was little improvement 
in benefit levels. With ERS the value of the benefit has trebled but 
there has been no improvement during the 1970s. Compared with 
gross earnings there has been no improvement at all over the whole 
period in the level of the standard rates. The introduction of ERS 
improved the value of the benefit in the 1960s, but this was not 
sustained into the 1970s. The value of the benefit compared with 
net income has also declined during the 1970s. 
Family support — family allowances, child tax allowances and 
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Table 5.5 Unemployment or sickness benefit for a man or single woman 
Equivalent value Per cent of Standard rates of 
at April 1980 average male UB/SBb and FAICBc 
prices (£) manual 
earnings 
as per cent of net 
average income. 
Couple + 1 child, 
male manual 
Year UB 	 UB +ERSa UB 	 UB +ERS worker 
July 1948 10.85 	 10.85 19.1 	 19.1 Oct 1948 37.8 
April 1961 14.92 	 14.92 19.1 	 19.1 Oct 1961 40.7 
November 1969 18.74 	 37.36 20.0 	 39.9 Oct 1969 43.4 
September 1971 19.30 	 40.92 19.5 	 41.4 Oct 1971 47.4 
October 1973 19.83 	 38.72 18.0 	 35.1 Oct 1973 44.6 
July 1974 20.45 	 38.87 18.6 	 35.4 Oct 1974 45.3 
November 1978 20.28 	 35.24 18.9 	 32.8 Oct 1978 44.0 
November 1979 20.30 	 33.32 18.8 	 30.8 Oct 1979 39.5 
November 1980 19.45 	 31.40 Oct 1979 - 
Notes: a UB+ERS = Unemployment benefit and earnings related supplement. 
b UB/S11 = Unemployment/Sickness benefit. 
c FA/CB = Family allowance/child benefit 
Sources: DHSS, Social Security Statistics, 1980, London, HMSO, Table 46.06; 
DHSS, Abstract of statistics for index of retail prices, average earnings, social 
security benefits and contributions, Branch HQ SR8a, Table 6.1a. 
Table 5.6 
	 Family support for a three-child family (children aged 11 or under) 
Year 
Equivalent value at 
November 1980 prices (£) 
Per cent of average male 
manual earnings 
August 1946 15.12 26.8 
April 1960 16.01 20.3 
April 1970 12.70 12.7 
April 1973 12.19 10.7 
April 1974 13.39 11.8 
April 1978 12.39 11.1 
April 1979 15.36 13.4 
November 1980 14.25 
- 
Note: 
	 Family support here includes family allowances (child benefit in later 
years) and the value of child tax allowances for those paying income tax at 
the standard rate. 
Sources: House of Commons, Hansard, 1981, Vol. 996, cols. 481-2; 
DHSS, Social Security Statistics, 1980, London, HMSO, Table 46.11. 
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child benefits — in the 1970s was mostly below the equivalent of its 
value when family allowances were introduced in 1946. Its value in 
comparison with earnings fell during the 1970s except when child 
benefits were increased to £4 per child per week in April 1979. The 
value of family support in November 1980 compared with both 
prices and earnings was probably lower than when family allow-
ances were first introduced in 1946. 
These comparisons hide a number of changes that have occur-
red in the relative value of benefits. Table 5.7 shows that the 
relative values of unemployment and other short-term insurance 
benefits have deteriorated during the 1970s, and it also shows the 
growing gap between ordinary and long-term scales of supplemen-
tary benefits. It indicates that the improvements that have been 
made in benefits have been concentrated on pensioners and the 
long-term sick or disabled and not on the unemployed. 
Table 5.7 
	 Relativities between benefits (unemployment benefit = 100) 
Year 
Unemployment Retirement 
benefit 	 pension 
SB 	 SB 
ordinary rates long-term rates 
July 1948 100 100 92.3 
April 1961 100 100 93.0 — 
November 1969 100 100 96.0 106.0 
September 1971 100 100 96.7 105.0 
October 1973 100 105.4 97.3 110.9 
July 1974 100 116.3 97.7 120.9 
November 1978 100 123.8 98.7 126.3 
November 1979 100 125.9 98.9 128.1 
November 1980 100 131.5 103.1 131.5 
Source: DHSS, Social Security Statistics, London, HMSO, 1980, Table 46.05. 
It is clear from the data presented in this section that despite a 
massive increase in social security expenditure during the 1970s it 
is not true that all benefits have improved in value either relative to 
earnings or prices. During the 1970s a pattern of annual up-ratings 
became established. It was first put into a statutory form in the 
Social Security Act 1973 when the Conservative government com-
mitted itself to reviewing benefits in line with price increases. In 
1975 when there were two increases, an amendment to the Social 
Security Act committed the Labour government to up-rating 
long-term benefits in line with prices or earnings whichever was 
greater and short-term benefits in line with price increases. In its 
1979 Budget the new Conservative government announced that 
they would amend the minimum statutory requirement to up-rate 
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long-term benefits to compensate for movements in prices only. 
Subsequently they announced and enacted that short-term insur-
ance benefits would be increased by 5 per cent less than the rate of 
inflation in 1980. 
Table 5.8 shows the increases in retirement pension and unemp-
loyment benefit from year to year compared with movements in 
earnings and prices. When fixing the levels of benefit, govern-
ments have to predict how earnings and prices will move six 
months in advance, and on the whole in the 1970s they were not 
very good at getting it right. Only in 1979 were pensions increased 
within one percentage point of the correct figure and only in 1973, 
1978 and 1979 were short-term benefits increased within one 
percentage point of the correct figure. In 1971, 1972, April 1975, 
1978 and 1980 pensions were increased by less than the increase in 
earnings and in 1973, April 1975, 1978 and 1980 unemployment 
and sickness benefits were increased by less than increases in 
prices. 
Cuts in social security expenditure 
The Conservative government's cuts in social security expenditure 
are discussed in the following section partly because they are 
unprecedented, partly because they demonstrate the consequ-
ences of reducing social security expenditure and partly because 
they reveal the lack of coherent policy making in this programme 
which has been a feature of the 1970s. 
The proposals for cuts in social security expenditure were incor-
porated in the 1980 White Paper (Treasury 1980a: 3). 
The Government intend to reduce public expenditure progressively in 
volume terms over the next four years . . . to bring down the rate of 
inflation and interest rates by curtailing the growth of the money supply 
and controlling Government borrowing; to restore incentives; and to 
plan for spending which is compatible both with the objectives for 
taxation and borrowing and with a realistic assessment of the prospects 
for economic growth. 
The main contribution that social security would make to this goal 
was, first, the minimum uprating of long-term benefits would be 
based on price movements only rather than on the greater of 
earnings or prices. Secondly, the ERS would be abolished from 1 
January 1982. Thirdly, the indexed increase in short-term national 
insurance benefits and long-term invalidity benefit in November 
1980 would be 5 per cent less than it should have been. Fourthly, 
the payment of short-term sickness benefit would become the 
responsibility of employers. 
Other minor changes were also made: a change in the entitle- 
e ents in prices only. 
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Table 5.8 
	 Increases in benefits, prices and earnings 
Year 
Retirement pensions 
Per cent increase 
over previous 
rate 
Per cent 	 Unemployment 
increase in benefit per cent 
average 	 increase over 
earnings 	 previous rate 
Per cent 
increase 
in prices 
September 1971 20.0 23.3 20.0 16.5 
October 1972 12.5 15.8 12.5 8.5 
October 1973 14.8 12.6 8.9 9.9 
July 1974 29.0 14.7 17.0 13.5 
April 1975 16.0 19.4 14.0 17.7 
November 1975 14.7 11.5 13.3 11.7 
November 1976 15.0 13.1 16.2 15,0 
November 1977 14.4 10.4 14.0 13.0 
November 1978 11.4 14.4 7.1 8.1 
November 1979 19.5 18.5 17.5 17.4 
November 1980 16.5 11.6 
Per cent increase 
November 1969 - 
November 1979 466 416 342 
Sources: DHSS, Social Security Statistics, 1980, London, HMSO, Tables 46.06 and 
46.09; 
DHSS, Abstract of statistics for index of retail prices, average earnings, social 
security benefits and contributions, 1980. 
ment formula for earnings related supplement for short-term 
benefits, a reduction in the interval between successive periods of 
interruption of employment which are to count as a single period 
in determining entitlement to benefits, no entitlement to sickness 
benefit for periods less than four days and the withdrawal of 
entitlement to unemployment benefit from claimants with sub-
stantial occupational pensions and reductions in striker's sup-
plementary benefit. Some one thousand additional staff would be 
engaged to detect fraud. Overall savings claimed would be about 
£300 million in 1981/2 and £130 million from the cessation of ERS 
in 1982/3. 
The up-rating of short-term insurance benefits by 5 per cent less 
than inflation would have represented a real cut of about £1.50 per 
week (in fact the full effect of this cut was not felt because the 
government over-estimated the rate of inflation in 1980 but abated 
the benefit increase in 1981 by 1 per cent to compensate for it). The 
abatement was justified by the government on the grounds that 
- short-term insurance benefits should be taxed and since because of 
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practical difficulties this could not be introduced until 1982, the 
abatement was an interim measure. 
The savings in expenditure are not more dramatic than they are 
because part of the savings in ERS and the lower up-ratings of 
benefits have to be offset against increases in claims for sup-
plementary benefit. The government predicted that the non-
pensioners on supplementary benefit would increase by over 
500,000 between 1979/80 and 1983/4 partly as a result of these 
measures. This is a transfer from contribution-financed benefits to 
tax-financed benefits and shifts from a reliance on an administra-
tively efficient contributory benefit to a relatively more costly 
means tested benefit. 
The rationale behind the government's expenditure plans was 
heavily criticised in a report of the Social Services Committee 
(1980) who did not think that the expenditure projections and 
assumptions 'are realistically and soundly based'. In particular the 
Committee thought that the estimates of unemployment were 
over-optimistic and if unemployment reached 21 million by 1982/3, 
which 'independent economic analysts' had expected rather than 
the 1.8 million assumed in the white paper, this would add about 
£750 million to the plans. This sum would have to come either 
from the £1500 million in the contingency reserve or from an 
increase in national insurance contributions. This would not be the 
only call on the contingency reserve. Because child benefits do not 
have statutory protection against inflation, increases to protect 
their value are never built in to the white paper projections. Thus 
any increase in the money value of child benefits would also have to 
come from the contingency reserve. For child benefits to maintain 
their November 1980 value of £4.75 in 1982/3 would require an 
addition of £350 million. Thus the DHSS would require about 
three-quarters of the contingency reserve despite the fact that the 
white paper states 'the Government will aim to avoid or minimise 
any additional expenditure from the reserve and to keep as much 
as possible of the reserve unspent' (Treasury 1980a: 8). 
The Select Committee criticised the government proposals for 
their inconsistencies. In order to 'save public money' the ERS was 
being abolished despite the fact that with lower national insurance 
contributions and increased payments in supplementary benefits 
and higher administrative costs, expenditure of tax revenue would 
actually increase. The cuts also would lead to increased administra-
tive costs. The administrative costs of national insurance benefit 
are about 41 per cent and of supplementary benefit about 17 per 
cent. It was expected that increasing unemployment would lead to 
a 3 per cent increase in administrative costs, and a further 1 per 
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cent, due to about 1000 extra staff, would arise from the abatement 
in the increase in short-term benefits in 1980 and the abolition of 
ERS in 1982. 
This Committee believes that whatever the sum available for social 
security spending, as much as possible of it should go to beneficiaries: we 
therefore view with particular concern any policy changes which at the 
same time reduce what beneficiaries receive while increasing the num-
bers administering the transfer. Furthermore, it seems unfortunate to 
absorb more real resources (i.e. public sector manpower) at the expense 
of transfer incomes (which simply shuffle around money but do not use 
up resources ) (Social Services Committee 1980: xvii) 
Strategic policy-making 
These criticisms from the Select Committee concern the specific 
proposals of the present government, but they also charge that 
there is an absence of strategic policy-making in government and 
this criticism could have been applied to all governments during 
the 1970s. The Select Committee (Social Services Committee 1980: 
xix) picked on the need for government 'to develop a coherent 
strategy concerning the overall impact of government policy deci-
sions — whether on taxes, benefits, subsidies or charges — on the 
relative living standards of different groups of beneficiaries and 
earners'. But there are also other important defects in the planning 
of social security expenditure. 
In general whatever the colour of the government in power 
during the 1970s the planning of social security expenditure has 
lacked coherence. No doubt the poor performance of the British 
economy with successive governments responding desperately to a 
current economic crisis has not been the best environment in which 
to concentrate on strategic planning. Most of the reform that has 
taken place in the social security system has therefore been incre-
mental and on a small scale. Only one major reform has reached 
the statute book, the Social Security Act 1975, which implemented 
the proposals outlined in the white paper 'Better Pensions' (DHSS 
1974). Full pensions under this scheme will not be paid until 1998 
and meanwhile over two million pensioners are dependent for part 
of their income on supplementary benefits and an estimated 
600,000 are eligible for benefit but not claiming what they are 
entitled to. 
All the other proposals for major reform to social security 
schemes in the 1970s foundered. The tax-credit proposals (Treas-
ury 1972b) fell with the Conservative government in 1974 but have 
subsequently not been implemented by the new Conservative gov-
ernment, largely because of their cost implications and the intro- 
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duction of child benefit. In 1971 lie_Einer_Committee (19741 
found wid_espread hardship_arwang_singleparent families, half of 
whom were dependent on supplementary . benefits. Finer con-
cluded that there should be a new system of income support for 
single parents and recommended a non-contributory guaranteed 
maintenance allowance (GMA). The Labour government rejected 
the GMA proposal on the grounds that it was means tested and the 
non-contributory allowance that pressure groups have called for 
has not been implemented on the grounds of cost. Instead single 
parents have benefited from modest reforms such as the family 
income supplement scheme, changes to the supplementary benefit 
scheme and child benefit, including the child benefit addition. 
The field of disability benefits presents perhaps the best exam-
ple of incremental and piecemeal reform in operation during the 
1970s. The attendance allowance, non-contributory invalidity 
pension, the mobility allowance and invalid care allowance were all 
introduced in the 1970s. This patchwork of overlapping and dis-
continuous benefits falls short of a comprehensive and coherent 
response to the income needs and extra expenses associated with 
disability. It is arguable that the creation of this hotchpotch of 
benefits has made it very difficult ever to provide for all the 
disabled the kind of national disability benefit that has been called 
for (Disability Alliance 1975). 
National insurance provision for the unemployed has all but 
collapsed. The insurance system really only provides any cover at 
all for the short-term unemployed with a good contribution 
record. However, in circumstances of increasing long-term unem-
ployment with many without an employment record or only 
intermittent periods of low earnings in unskilled jobs, fewer and , 
fewer of the unemployed have benefited from the insurance sys-
tem. Nearly half the unemployed now receive supplementary 
benefit, fewer than one in six are in receipt of ERS, less than 40 per 
cent receive unemployment benefit and nearly a quarter of the 
unemployed do not appear to be receiving any benefit at all. 
The result of this failure to plug the gaps in Beveridge's national 
insurance scheme and bring it up to date to meet the needs of the 
1970s has been that there have continued to be very large numbers 
dependent for whole or part of their income on supplementary 
benefits, in fact nearly 9 per cent of the UK population including 
half of all single parents, half of the unemployed and a third of 
pensioners. This problem of large numbers of claimants utilising a 
means-tested individualised service has produced serious prob-
lems in the administration of supplementary benefits. In an effort 
to resolve these the government established a review of the sup- 
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plementary benefits scheme in 1976 (DHSS 1978). Although the 
review itself was a remarkable example of sustained, coherent and 
integrated analysis of an extremely complex subject, carried out in 
a very open way, because it was a no-cost review and had to ignore 
the rest of the social security system, what emerged from the review 
will do little to relieve the difficulties of administering means-
testing on a mass scale. 
Perhaps one of the most hopeful reforms in the 1970s and one 
that was unique in integrating the benefit system with the tax 
system was the child benefit scheme. It was only implemented after 
a bitter struggle within the Labour cabinet between Treasury and 
Social Services ministers. Unlike other benefits it was never index 
linked, and the level of family support has not been maintained in 
the face of inflation. 
Apart from national economic preoccupations which have 
dominated consideration of all social policies and been reflected in 
the unwillingness of successive governments to raise the revenue 
for increases in expenditure by increases in taxation, there have 
been difficulties within Whitehall in getting the kind of integrated 
decision-making that would enable cohesive policy-making. 
Despite the establishment of the Central Policy Review Staff and 
the publication of its plea for a joint approach to social policy 
(CPRS 1975} there is really little evidence that this approach has 
operated in the field of social security policy. Perhaps the most 
dramatic evidence of this is in the lack of coherent planning in the 
setting of tax and benefit levels and in evaluating how they operate 
together on incomes. 
The lack of integration in tax and benefit policy results in there 
being a range of earnings where a family can be worse off or little 
better off as a result of having a wage increase, and where one 
family can be worse off or little better off than another similar 
family with lower earnings, the so-called 'poverty trap'. In 1980 it 
did not matter whether a family was earning £50 or £100 per week 
because their net disposable resources, what they have left to spend 
after paying income tax, national insurance contributions, rent 
1 and rates and receiving any child benefits, FIS, rent and rate 
1 rebates or free school meals, would be the same (Bradshaw 1980). 
Although the existence of the poverty trap has been recognised 
since Piachaud's (1971) seminal work on the topic, governments 
have continued to make separate decisions -about tax and benefit 
policy in separate departments without any integrated scrutiny of 
their joint effects and their social consequences. In Whitehall only 
the DHSS have the capacity to calculate the combined effects of 
taxes and benefits and the Treasury and Inland Revenue fix taxes 
 l olicy 
 i   ( S 1978). Although the 
   
t  nalysis of n ext e l i  t i  
 t  i e 
it  t  i  
fic lties f a inisteri  ea s-
l . 
ps one of t  
ting the benefit 
 a  t  il  fit sche e. It was only implemented after 
 t uggle it i  t   cabinet between easury and 
i i t  t it  it a  er i  
 fa ily support ha  t  ai t
l
ti  
ti  f ll i l policies and been reflected in 
 i e govern ents to rai  t   
 i   ses in taxation, there have 
i lti  it i  hitehal  in get ing the kind of integrated 
- a ing. 
li  taff a  
 j i t pproach to social policy 
 t r  s 
t  i  t  f it ps the t 
ti  
l   
 i t
nge of rnings where a family can be worse off  little 
lt f   i ease, and where one 
 f r littl  tt f t  
 it  l er e '. I   it 
 f i    £100 per week 
 t i ble resources, what they have left to spend 
l i ance contributions, rent 
tes and receiving any child benefits, IS, rent and rate 
t   f ee school ls, l   t   ( dshaw 1980). 
lt  t  istence of the poverty tra    
ud's (1971) se i l rk  t  t i ,  
t  i i  f
t  rt ents it t ny i t ated scrutiny of 
l . I  
  t  t  f 
y nd Inland Rev  f
Public Expenditure on Social Security 107 
at the time of the annual budget with an eye to national accounting, 
without consultation with the relevant benefit-paying department 
and with no prospective evaluation of their interrelation with 
benefits. 
The Conservative government elected in 1979 came to power on 
a platform devoted to releasing incentives by a reduction in taxa-
tion, but it has presided over, if not purposefully created, a worsen-
ing of incentives for a substantial minority of the population. 
Increases in school meals' prices and other charges, the abolition of 
the lower rate band of income tax, changes in benefit levels and 
increases in rent and rates (to reduce public expenditure) have 
made the poverty trap worse than ever: more families are falling 
into it, the marginal tax rate is higher and the chances of someone 
actually being worse off as a result of a wage increase considerably 
enhanced. The combined marginal tax rate of national insurance 
contributions, income tax and rate and rent rebates — that is the 
amount of each extra pound earned that is lost — is at least 59.7 per 
cent (and can be 67.9 per cent). This is equivalent to the highest 
rate of tax paid on earnings of £25,000. Very little is known about 
the effects of the poverty trap on behaviour, but it must have some 
effect on incentives, on the morale of the poor, influence sense-
lessness in wage bargaining and certainly involves much giving and 
taking of what the Meade Report (1978) described as ludicrously 
inconsistent taxes and benefits. 
The unemployment trap is another area where overlapping 
taxes and benefits conspire to reduce the differentials in and out of 
work. A great deal more attention is paid to the unemployment 
trap than the poverty trap and the present government's decision 
to abate unemployment benefit and eventually tax it, and to abolish 
the earnings-related supplement, are partly motivated by concern 
with the unemployment trap. 
The evidence on the effects of the unemployment trap tends to 
contradict the beliefs of a wide section of public opinion. Atkinson 
and Flemming (1978) have recently reviewed the economic litera-
ture on the relationship between incentives and unemployment 
benefits and concluded that the 'replacement ratios' between 
benefits and earnings have a very modest effect on benefit dura-
tion. Does it really matter if there is some delay in filling vacancies 
which can then be filled by others who would otherwise be unemp-
loyed? 
There are many other ways in which the effects of social security 
expenditure are mediated by decisions in other expenditure prog-
rammes and where this interaction is not fully recognised. The 
Supplementary Benefits Commission has consistently drawn 
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attention to the disjunction that exists in the treatment of housing 
costs in the supplementary benefit scheme and their treatment 
through the rent and rate rebate schemes (Bradshaw and Bradley 
1979). This disjunction is one of the main causes of the 'better off' 
problem as well as being a source of confusion and complexity in 
the supplementary benefit scheme. Yet no government has so far 
been able to implement a reform. 
Neither, apart from child benefits, has there been any integra-
tion of social welfare and fiscal welfare. Not until 1979 did the 
public expenditure white papers recognise that 'tax expenditure' 
might be as important as direct transfers in meeting needs and 
begin to publish the details of the revenue cost of certain tax reliefs. 
One example of the opportunities presented by integrating social 
security and fiscal policy to achieve social objectives was raised by 
the Meade Committee (1978) who suggested that the revenue 
forgone in the married man's tax allowance, now some £2600 
million per year, could be better used paying enhanced child 
benefit and a home responsibility benefit to women who needed to 
stay at home to look after young children or disabled adult rela-
tives. 
With rapidly rising rates of unemployment in the latter part of 
the decade which will continue well into the 1980s, the area where 
strategic planning has been most needed is in the treatment of 
unemployment. Unemployment is a waste and works against a 
government seeking to control public expenditure, keep down 
taxation and reduce the public sector borrowing requirement. For 
each job lost in the private sector official estimates conclude that 
the cost to the Exchequer in 1980/1 prices is £3400 (Treasury 
1981b). This is made up of £2050 from loss of income tax and 
national insurance contributions, and government expenditure is 
increased by £1350 per year in unemployment and supplementary 
benefits, rent and rate rebates and administrative costs. When 
other factors are taken into account, such as redundancy pay-
ments, losses of indirect taxation and lost production, the costs 
could be in excess of £5000 per year. For less than that sum it would 
be possible to provide by public investment or public expenditure, 
productive or socially useful employment on a wider scale than 
envisaged in existing employment schemes (see Chapter 9). 
The effectiveness of social security expenditure 
I One difficulty in evaluating the effectiveness of social security 
expenditure is in establishing its purpose. The nearest the Treas-
ury ever got to a definition was in the following anodyne statement 
which appeared in the 1979 white paper. 
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The primary purpose of social security benefits is to provide a cash 
benefit in the event of certain contingencies such as sickness, unem-
ployment or retirement. Supplementary benefits and family income sup-
plement (FIS) remedy income deficiencies. The child benefit system 
provides income for families. (Treasury 1979a: 150) 
One other white paper attempted to describe the purposes of social 
security expenditure. 
The purpose is to provide income. . . . The benefits by which this 
redistribution is effected are various.. . . Some benefits . . . do no more 
than supplement a claimant's main income . . . the supplementary 
benefits scheme which considers all the claimant's needs and resources 
and guarantees that those needs will be met when he cannot work. 
(Treasury 1972a: 74) 
One way of evaluating social security expenditure is in its effec-
tiveness in tackling poverty. The government has published esti-
mates of the numbers in the population living in or at the margins 
of poverty based on Family Expenditure Survey data since 1972. 
Only since 1974 are the figures comparable and since 1977 the data 
are only produced every two years (DHSS 1980b). 
Table 5.9 Persons living in poverty 1974-77 (thousands) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 
Persons below SB level 1 410 2 030 2 280 2 020 
Persons on SB 3 730 3 770 4 090 4 160 
Persons up to 140% of SB 5 260 7 360 8 500 7 840 
Total 10 400 13 160 14 870 14 020 
Sources: DHSS, Social Security Statistics, 1980, London, HMSO, Table 47.07; 
Field, F., Poverty and Inequality', Poverty, no.42, pp.3-45. 
The number living in poverty clearly depends on how poverty is 
defined. In 1977 there were 6.180 million persons living at or 
below the supplementary benefit level and a further 7.840 million 
living on incomes within 140 per cent of supplementary benefit 
level. The number of persons in poverty has risen between 1974 
and 1977 and although there was a slight fall between 1976 and 
1977 nearly a quarter of the population are still living on incomes 
which are very close to poverty levels. Thos living below sup-
plementary benefit levels consist of people over pensionable age 
who are eligible for and not claiming supplementary benefit 
(760,000 in 1977) and families who are recipients of national 
Insurance benefits and not claiming supplementary benefit or 
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families in full-time work earning low wages (620,000 in the latter 
group in 1979). 
These are the numbers living at or around the officially 
approved poverty level but what does that mean in practice? The 
studies that have been done on the levels of living of those on 
supplementary benefit suggest that in general it is enough to live 
on and provides a dreary diet for a good manager with no allow-
ance for vices. One particularly striking study was carried out by 
Piachaud (1979). He costed what he considered to be a modest 
modern minimum life style for a child, including the cost of food, 
fuel, clothing, entertainments, holidays, toys, pocket money and 
presents and concluded that the supplementary benefit scales for 
children needed to be increased by a half if they were to provide 
even this bleak lifestyle. 
Apart from the relief of poverty the otherossil:ge,geneial 
objective of social security expenditure is to...redistribute income. 
Cash benefits play a major role in income redistribution. 
Table 5.10 Cash benefits as a percentage of final income, 1971 and 1979 
Average per Average per Average per household 
household household 1979 (adjusted to a per 
Quintile 1971 1979 equivalent adult basis) 
Quintile 1a 72.2 78.9 79.7 
Quintile 2 42.1 36.4 36.6 
Quintile 3 7.9 11.9 12.8 
Quintile 4 5.1 7.2 7.8 
Quintile 5 2.7 4.5 3.1 
All 12.3 17.5 21.4 
Note: a Quintile groups of households ranked by original income. 
Sources: CSO, Economic Trends, London, HMSO, February 1978; 
CSO, 'The effects of taxes and benefits on household income 1979', 
Economic Trends, London, HMSO, January 1981, pp.104-31. 
To compare the figures in Table 5.10 between 1971 and 1979 
would be misleading as the latter incorporate child tax allowances 
into child benefits as a cash benefit, but the table__shows. how 
important social security benefits are in maintaining the incomes of 
the lowest income households. Beckerman, in work for the Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (1978), 
calculated that in 1975 without cash benefits, the number of 
families living in poverty would increase more than sevenfold. So, 
clearly, s. . ex enditur re utes I 	 • II 	 111 II • 
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Table 5.11 Effects of taxes and benefits on the distribution of incomes, 1971-73 
and 1979 
Quintile 
Percentage in each quintile group of households, re-ranked 
at each stage 
Original income 
	 Net income 	 Final income 
1971-3 1979 1971-3 1979 1971 -3 1979 
Bottom tenth 	 0.1 	 - 	 2.6 
	
2.6 
	 2.6 	 2.8 
Quintile 1 	 1.4 	 0.5 	 6.6 	 6.5 	 6.8 	 7:1 
Quintile 2 
	
10.8 	 9.0 	 12.6 	 12.0 	 12.4 	 12.0 
Quintile 3 	 18.4 	 19.0 	 18.1 	 18.0 	 17.9 	 18.0 
Quintile 4 	 25.7 	 27.0 	 23.9 	 24.0 	 24.0 	 24.0 
Quintile 5 	 43.7 	 45.0 	 39.0 	 39.0 	 38.9 	 38.0 
Top tenth 	 26.9 	 27.0 	 23.5 	 23.0 	 23.4 	 22.0 
Gini coefficient (%) 42.3 	 45.2 	 32.6 	 32.3 	 32.4 	 31.5 
Sources: Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth, Report 
no.1, Initial Report on the Standing Reference, Cmnd 6171, London, 
HMSO, 1975, Table 24; 
CSO, 'The effects of taxes and benefits on household income 1979', 
Economic Trends, London, HMSO, January 1981, Table C. 
there been any reduction in inequalities during the 1970s? Table 
5.11 compares the effects of all taxes and benefits on the income 
distribution for the period 1971-3 with 1979. The original income 
distribution was marginally more unequal in 1971-3 than 1979. 
Net income and final income were marginally less unequal in the 
latter period. Overall it is possible to conclude that the progressive 
effect of direct and indirect taxes, cash benefits and services 
increased only very slightly during the 1970s. 
The previous analysis has concentrated on the vertical redis-
tribution that has occurred during the 1970s inter alia as a result of 
social security expenditure. Another important redistributive 
_purpose of social security expeadituteds_tn-maintain horizontal 
equity in the distribution of income. Table 5.12 shows that a three 
child family started the decade with. 23 per cent more disposable 
resources than a single person and ended with 20 per cent more -
that is there was a small improvement in the relative net income of a 
single person. A family on a wage of two-thirds average, however, 
improved its position relative to a single person (DHSS 19800. 
Conclusion 
Public expenditure on social security in the 1970s was protected 
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Table 5.12 Ratios between the net disposable resources of a single person and a 
couple with three children aged, 3, 8 and 12 
Year I average wage average wage 11 average wage 
April 1970 135 123 115 
April 1974 147 122 114 
April 1978 147 121 114 
April 1980 145 120 113 
Source: Derived from DHSS, 'Income and means tested benefits, historical 
model' Branch SR3A (unpublished). 
from the cuts that many other expenditure programmes experi-
enced and there was a substantial increase in expenditure. How-
ever the net consequences of these increases were limited — most of 
the extra money went to maintain benefits or pay benefits for the 
increasing numbers of dependent people in the population. 
Reform was small-scale and piecemeal and failed to integrate with 
other spending programmes. Yet social security expenditure 
remains vital to the living standards of a significant and currently 
growing minority of the population. Cuts in benefits are a direct 
attack on the most vulnerable in our society. 
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